Imagine the following situation: two good friends decide to have dinner at a certain restaurant and agree to meet each other at the restaurant at five-thirty in the evening. Whether or not they honor their established meet-up time can be seen as a game theory dilemma.
In the situation there are four alternatives: (1) they could both show up on time; (2) friend A could show up on time and friend B could show up late; (3) friend B could show up on time and friend A could show up late; (4) they could both show up late.
Now, because time is infinite, alternatives 2, 3, and 4 are vague--they fail to specify the exact moment in which one or both of the friends arrive (example: in alternative 4, both friends could show up late but at the same time, or they could both show up late but with one friend showing up before the other). So, to clarify things a little bit, lets just state the four alternatives as:
(1) they could both show up on time, at 5:30pm
(2) friend A could show up earlier than friend B
(3) friend B could show up earlier than friend A
(4) they could both show up late but at the same time
Alternatives 1 and 4 are optimal. In alternatives 2 and 3, one person has to sit around waiting for the other to arrive.
What is interesting is that in punctual societies, like the United States (or stereotypically Germany and Japan), there exists a socially ingrained consensus to choose alternative 1. In countries where such a socially ingrained consensus does not exist (stereotypically non-punctual societies: the developing world), each individual shoots for alternative 4, but ends up with alternatives 2 or 3.
